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Abstract
Physics searches for the invariants in the multitude of observations. In this
paper we look for the invariants of probabilistic observation, whereby we avoid to
postulate any physical structures as given. We let structure be a consequence of the
rarely mentioned assumption of science that new information obtained by additional
observation should lead to more accurate knowledge of the invariants. This leads to
unique random variables for expressing probabilistic information obtained as clicks in
the two detectors of a yes-no experiment: Complex probabiliy amplitudes, as familiar
from quantum theory. Similarly, the quantum mechanical superposition principle is
singled out by the demand that also predictions must become more accurate with
increasing number of observations which serve as input.
By considering that the external conditions of a probabilistic experiment can
themselves be monitored at the most detailed level, we are lead to probabilistic
experiments where two clicks happen in coincidence at different detectors. We find
that these, and more generally, any higher-order coincidence experiments, must be
described just as a one-click experiment with the same number of possible outcomes.
An observable probability is found to be controllable by two independent ex-
perimental conditions, which are naturally parametrized by polar coordinates. The
relation of a probability to the determining conditions is that of an orientation in a
3-dimensional cartesian space.
We conclude that the probabilistic paradigm of current physics inherently defines
a method of forming concepts and making predictions, which uses the available infor-
mation optimally, and which may be irrefutable within the probabilistic paradigm.
Because, whenever a prediction turns out wrong, it postulates an as yet unmonitored
condition as the culprit, and shows how to incorporate it formally. The Hilbert space
formalism of quantum theory appears to be isomorphic to this method.
1 Introduction
In an article on ”Physical Reality” Max Born once said that in his opinion the key to a
reasonable concept of reality, not only in physics, but for all aspects of the world, can be
found in the idea of the invariant [1]. In this paper I will not discuss ”reality”, because it
is an elusive notion, at best. Rather I will apply Born’s idea to the basic phenomenology
of physics: The observation of ”clicks”. This phenomenology appears to be incapable of
further reduction. Therefore, the occurrence of clicks shall be the unquestioned starting
point from which I will try to extract invariants contained in observed data to see what
kind of structure emerges. No fields, no particles, no space, let alone any specific theory,
are to be assumed as given. Indeed, the very idea that the world should be made up of
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”something” with muscular connotation — whence the term physics— will be put aside.
The structures which arise will solely be due to the interpretative tool for extracting
meaning from the data of observations.
First I want to clarify why I consider the basic phenomenology of physics, which is the
phenomenology of quantum physics, as irreducible. In quantum physics an observation
yields one outcome of a countable number of possible outcomes. In the simplest case only
two outcomes are possible: A detector may fire or it may not. This was not the case in
classical physics. There, a pointer could take a continuum of positions. When reading the
position, the experimenter would in principle have assigned values to an infinite number
of bits, to put it in modern language. Naturally, he or she could not do this in finite
time, and so had to accept a cut-off error in reading the position of the pointer, thereby
assigning values to only a finite number of bits. In quantum experiments this comes about
automatically. A quantum observation contains no cut-off error of reading the instrument.
For an unexplained, and perhaps unexplainable reason, only a finite number of bits can
be observed in finite time [2]. Now we could ask ourselves whether a still more elementary
mode of observation is possible. Imagine a hitherto unknown strata of the world. How
could it manifest itself? Although we cannot exclude that it might affect an observer in
some unintelligible way, it is clear that, whatever the observer records, and thus captures
for further communication, will be expressible without loss by a finite number of bits. This
means we would be back at the phenomenology of quantum physics.
So, with Max Born’s view in mind, the task at hand is to look for all kinds of invariants
that can be extracted from discrete and finite data. In trying to do this, we are faced
with the need for interpretation at the very beginning. Should we assume that observed
data are deterministically related to the data of other observations, or should we assume a
probabilistic link, or something different altogether? I want to discard a deterministic link.
The reason is that the amount of records available to the observer to form a conception of
the world is always finite, so that many different sets of laws can be invented to account for
them. Pinning down any one of these sets as the laws of nature is then purely speculative.
On the other hand we have the probabilistic view, which is successfully used to interpret
quantum observations. It seems that in this view we assign a minimum of information
content to observed data. To see this, imagine the N trials of a probabilistic yes-no
experiment, like tossing a coin, in which the outcome ”yes” occurs L times. If we want to
tell somebody else the result it is sufficient to state the values of N and of L. With the
deterministic view, in which the precise sequence of outcomes is important, we would in
general have to communicate many more details to enable the receiver to reconstruct this
sequence.
Nevertheless, taking the number of trials and the number of ”yes” outcomes as com-
pletely representing the observed data does not yet constitute the probabilistic view. We
could still extract N + 1 different messages from this experiment, because L can be be-
tween 0 and N . The number of different messages would grow linearly with the number
of trials. But we know that in probabilistic yes-no experiments the number of distinguish-
able messages only grows as the square root of the number of trials, due to the binomial
distribution. Of the three views for extracting meaning from N bits the probabilistic view
thus expects to obtain the least information. This fits well with our premise to assume
no physical structure as given. Also, the probabilistic view invites the question whether
it leads to apparant but testable laws — even if there are no laws contained in the data
— by mirroring to the observer as unexpected structure what he has put in as rules for
categorizing data. If true, this would indeed be an appealing basis for science. The pos-
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sibility of lawlessness, and laws being only symmetries, has recently been taken up by
several authors [3], [4], [5], although it may be traced back to Kant, and possibly further.
Hence, we shall adopt the probabilistic view. Our aim is to look for invariants in
discrete data, where we assume that only the probability that we have observed this
outcome rather than any other one is to render meaning.
2 The observer’s situation
Before we begin our actual analysis it will be useful to clarify what we mean by observation.
For us humans observation is the act of taking note of a sensory impression or of a state
of mind. This ties observation to consciousness, which in turn seems to be separate
for different individuals. An individual may communicate its observations to others [6].
Parallel to the stream of observational data the human observer is aware of the passage
of time. Without having to disect the concept of time here, I think it is a precondition
of science, impossible to extract from the discoveries of science. The passage of time can,
of course, be linked to properties of observable quantities, e.g. the increase of entropy.
But ultimately this is only a rewording of the a priori statement ”time passes”. For
our purposes it is sufficient to assume that the observer automatically assigns a unique
”identity tag” in the form of a time stamp to each observed fact.
The empirical sciences take their input mainly from sensory impressions. These im-
pressions, but more generally quantities derived from them, constitute the data which
are subjected to rational analysis in order to obtain invariants with respect to all kinds
of operations. Such unveiled invariants are the essential structure contained in the data.
Therefore, the world to the observer is the set of invariants in his or her data.
The role of consciousness in observation is the ability to take note of. This is how
data come into existence. For an idealized model of the observer we can simply postulate
that data come into existence at sensors. This liberates our further considerations from
the philosophical burden of the term consciousness. Hence we can think of the observer
as a machine with an internal clock, a huge memory to never have to forget data, and
equally huge data analysing and reasoning abilities [7]. The machine receives data in the
form of a persistent stream of bits at a number of sensors. At any unit time interval
each of the sensors can only show ”0” or ”1”. We could call this machine the common
observer (Fig.1a). A further idealization is the assumption that the observer has only one
sensor, shown as the ultimate observer in Fig.1b. This is possible, because ultimately the
data of each of several sensors will have to be taken up by the central calculating and
reasoning agent, otherwise they cannot be known to that agent and we cannot speak of
just one observer. Neither the common nor the ultimate observer have any possibility to
act, because making a decision and acting is actually again just a particular stream of
data (for us humans it appears as data generated internally in our brain and body). The
idealized observer has initially no idea of ”body”. This is something it would have to find
as a particular set of invariants in the data. And it has no concept of existing ”in” a space.
It should discover space as a convenient form of representation of data. All experience
of this observer, ”external” as well as ”internal”, ”mental” as well as ”sensory”, is just a
stream of data.
We should note that the idea of seeking structure in the mere fact of the persistent
increase of information in the form of known data is not new. But it seems to have been
motivated by cosmological considerations, e.g., von Weizsa¨cker’s ur-theory [8], [9], [10],
[11], or the program which ensued from Eddington’s Fundamental Theory [12].
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In this paper we will not take direct recourse to either the common or the ultimate
observer. Nevertheless, I think it is important to illustrate the level of abstraction to
which we are lead once we accept the empirical finding of quantum physics that any
observation yields a discrete and finite outcome. What we will do in the following sections
Figure 1: Machine idealizations of the observer. a) The common observer has several sensors.
b) The ultimate observer has only one sensor.
is to investigate the more practical question of how we gain information in elementary
experiments and what is the optimal way to represent this knowledge by means of numbers
to bring out the invariants. (Since we do not presuppose that nature is in any way
”mathematical”, the representation of knowledge by numbers rather than just arbitrary
names will at one point have to be justified. This is not the purpose of the paper. We just
use numbers as a convenient resource of names. But clearly, the fact that a number has
two neighbours forces a structure into the representation of knowledge, which one should
be aware of.) To this end we will characterize experiments according to how many separate
clicks constitute a single trial. A click is conventionally associated with the registration of
a particle at a detector which can only indicate click or no-click in one unit interval of its
time resolution. The simplest case is an experiment where a click can occur in one of two
detectors (or occurrence or non-occurrence of a click at just one detector). This can be
extended to experiments with an arbitray number of detectors, where the single click of a
trial can occur in any of them. The next level of experiments would be those, in which the
registration of two clicks constitutes a single trial. Then we can go to experiments where
three clicks happen per trial, etc. But we will confine ourselves to one-click and two-click
experiments, because these are sufficient to reveal the essential invariants we are aiming
for.
Strictly speaking, the distinction of levels of probabilistic experiments according to
how many clicks constitute a single trial is already a concession to familiar physics. From
a logical point of view the only relevant criterion is how many different outcomes are
possible in a single trial. And if these are more than two, we can always label a particular
outcome as ”yes” and collect the others into ”no”, so that we have again just yes-no
experiments. The invariants extractable from the yes-no experiment are therefore basic to
all experimentation. We will look at this experiment now.
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3 The observation of a probability
The aim of observations is to learn something about the situation we are investigating.
A more correct way of putting this is that we have a number of hypotheses on what the
situation might be and by means of observations we try to exclude as many of them as
we can, so that only few remain as possibly true at the chosen level of confidence. An
everyday example would be the test of the state of charge of a battery. Initially we cannot
say anything. Therefore the range of hypotheses has to encompass all possibilities from
”no charge” to ”full charge”. By measurement of the current through a specified resistance
we obtain information. On the basis of these data we exclude all hypotheses except those
which conjectured a state of charge compatible with the uncertainty interval of the result
of the measurement.
When we determine the parameters of a physical situation through the measurement
of a probability, we proceed in the same manner. For the sake of concreteness, we imagine
an experiment where a particle can impinge on one of two detectors (Fig.2). The overall
physical situation determines the probability that it impinges on detector 1, and thereby
also the complementary probability that it impinges on detector 2. We assume we do
Figure 2: The yes-no experiment. The physical conditions determine the probability for a click
to happen at detector 1 or at detector 2. The click is indicated by the full circle.
not know which physical conditions have been set. By measuring the probability p for a
click in detector 1 (or, conversely, of 1 − p for a click in detector 2) we wish to eliminate
hypotheses on the physical situation. We will denote hypotheses by the real variable
χ. The number of hypotheses in the interval (χ, χ + ∆χ) shall be proportional to ∆χ
and independent of χ. In this way, χ linearly enumerates the different hypotheses we
have about the physical situation. Since χ will have a functional relation to the physical
parameters of the experiment, χ can also be thought of as a physical parameter. This
is how we will use χ later on. But we will always keep in mind that χ is originally a
label enumerating hypotheses. In fact it will turn out that this is all we need, and those
”actually physical parameters”, to which we think χ to be related, will never have to be
specified and only serve as a guide to our imagination.
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Figure 3: Mapping of physical hypotheses χ to probabilities p. Observations permit to determine
p to within an interval, which in turn permits to narrow down the range of hypotheses, which
we can consider as possibly true at the chosen confidence level, to the corresponding intervals of
χ.
In order to be able to exclude hypotheses by measuring the probability p, we need a
mapping of χ to p. It is important to note that we are completely free in inventing this
mapping. The reason for this is that the laws existing between the parameters of the
physical situation and the probability p, can be seen as laws between those parameters
and χ, plus a mapping of χ to p. Figure 3 illustrates the mapping, and how we exclude
hypotheses by measuring the probability. When N trials have been made, of which L
resulted in a click at detector 1, we can estimate the true value of p to within an uncer-
tainty interval 2∆p by means of ordinary probability theory. This permits to isolate the
corresponding hypotheses as possibly true at the chosen confidence level. As can be seen
in Fig.3, their labels χ need not be in just one interval, because we will permit different
hypotheses to predict the same p. And, in order to facilitate mathematical manipulation,
we will use a mapping where neighbouring values of χ correspond to neighbouring values
of p. But aside from these technical aspects, what principle criteria should we follow? I
think there are two properties to be considered. The first is a belief at the bottom of
any rational endeavour, and in particular of empirical science, which is so elementary that
it is rarely spelled out: Through observation our information about the world can only
increase, never just stay the same, and never decrease. For our problem this implies that,
the number of hypotheses still considered as possibly true after a number of observations
have been made, should strictly decrease with increasing number of observations. The
total length of the intervals isolated on the χ-axis in Fig.3 should therefore get smaller
with each additional trial. It is a surprising but well known fact of statistics that almost
all well-behaved mappings of χ to p do not have this property.
The second property also concerns the number of hypotheses not yet excluded by the
data. Consider two runs of the experiment in Fig.2. In each run N trials are made. Let us
6
assume detector 1 registered L counts in the first run, and a different number of L′ counts
in the second run. In general, this will isolate different intervals on the χ-axis, whose total
length will also differ. Therefore, the total number of possibly true hypotheses will also
be different, in general, although we have done the same number of observations. This is
a skewed state of affairs. We would like to be in a position, where N observations always
isolate equally many hypotheses as possibly true, and where the result L only determines
the location of these hypotheses on the χ-axis. This would reflect the fact that the number
of trials, N , is not a result. It is something the experimenter can decide. Therefore, we
demand that our mapping of χ to p has the property that the total number of hypotheses
not excluded by the experimental data be invariant with respect to the outcome of the
experiment and only depend on the number of observations, i.e. trials. We may conjecture
that this affords great predictive power when we do chains of experiments, in which the
parameters of one experiment are set according to the results of earlier ones, as is the
conduct of ordinary science. The space of hypotheses will then be multidimensional. But,
while the results of the experiments are open, we can know in advance how much of this
space will have been excluded by the experiments. We only need to fix the number of
trials of each of the different probabilistic experiments. I think once we have accepted
an intrinsically probabilistic view of the world, it is especially this latter property of
invariance, which should allow us to define an investigative method which nothing can
escape.
The two principle properties we wish to have can be summarized in graphical terms as
follows: The mapping of the hypotheses χ to the probabilities p shall be such that, while
the location of the isolated intervals on the χ-axis in Fig.3 will depend on the result L of
the experiment, their total length must only depend on the number N of observations and
must strictly decrease with this number. Formally, we want to transform the observed
random variable L/N to another one, which has the property that its standard deviation
becomes independent of L when N becomes large.
We will now derive this mapping [13]. We have done N trials and registered L clicks
in detector 1. The two integers, N and L, must serve to pin down the fixed, but unknown,
probability ptrue that the particle hits detector 1. The random variable L/N is subject to
a binomial distribution. Since this distribution has a finite standard deviation, it fulfills
Chebyshev’s inequality [14]:
Prob (|ptrue − L/N | > kσ) ≤ 1
k2
, (1)
where the standard deviation σ is given by
σ =
√
ptrue(1− ptrue)
N
. (2)
This inequality means that, the probability that the ratio L/N will deviate from ptrue by
more than k standard deviations is less than or equal to 1/k2. The arbitrary confidence
parameter k only makes sense for k > 1. Our best estimate for ptrue, which we call pb, is
pb =
L
N
. (3)
With this definition, the interval, within which ptrue can be found with a probability larger
than 1− 1/k2, is obtained as
pbf + k2
2N
f − kf
√
pb(1− pb)
N
+
k2
4N2
, pbf +
k2
2N
f + kf
√
pb(1− pb)
N
+
k2
4N2

 , (4)
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where f = (1 + k
2
N
)−1. For sufficiently large N this reduces to the interval
(pb − k∆pb, pb + k∆pb) (5)
with
∆pb =
√
pb(1− pb)
N
, (6)
which is the familiar form for the estimate of an unknown probability from observed data.
The width of the uncertainty interval, eq.(5), is 2k∆pb. We will call ∆pb the uncertainty
of our best estimate pb. The total length of the corresponding intervals on the axis of the
hypotheses will be proportional to a quantity ∆χ, which we will call the uncertainty of χ,
and which is given by
∆χ =
∣∣∣∣∣ dχdpb
∣∣∣∣∣∆pb =
∣∣∣∣∣ dχdpb
∣∣∣∣∣
√
pb(1− pb)
N
. (7)
(Here we have tacitly assumed the validity of the gaussian approximation of the posterior
probability distributions both for the estimates of p and of χ, which is justified for suffi-
ciently large N .) According to our second principal property, ∆χ must only depend on
N . Hence we must have ∣∣∣∣∣ dχdpb
∣∣∣∣∣
√
pb(1− pb) = C (8)
where C is a positive real constant. From (7) and (8) we obtain, what we had required:
∆χ =
C√
N
. (9)
Because of the absolute sign, integration of (8) yields two solutions:
χ± = ±C arcsin(2p− 1) + θ± (10)
where θ± are real constants. However, for any choice of the constants C, θ+ and θ−, the
solution χ− will be a linear function of the solution χ+, such that it is actually not a
different mapping of hypotheses to probabilities. Therefore, we only need to consider the
solution χ+, which we will simply call χ, and the arbitrary constants will be C and θ. The
inverse of eq.(10) is thus
p = cos2
(
χ− θ
2C
)
. (11)
It is depicted graphically in Fig. 4. An experimentally established uncertainty interval
of p defines an infinite number of corresponding uncertainty intervals on the axis of χ,
whose width is invariant with respect to the outcome of the experiment. Note that we can
infer numerical values to label the hypotheses to which the result of a concrete experiment
points, only after fixing C and θ .
Although eq.(11) is common knowledge in statistics, its significance to physics seems
to have gone unnoticed until the work of Wootters on distinguishability in quantum ex-
periments [15].
As we have mentioned before, and as is evident from Fig.4, the invariance property of
∆χ permits to make a very powerful statement. One can specify with the confidence level
fixed by the parameter k of eq.(1), the fraction of hypotheses excluded by N trials of the
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Figure 4: Mapping from observed probability, p, to the label of hypotheses, χ, for two experi-
ments with the same number of trials, N = 100. In one experiment detector 1 clicked L = 95
times, in the other only L = 50 clicks occurred. The uncertainty ranges on the p-axis are very
different, but on the χ-axis they are equal. Therefore, both experiments excluded equally many
hypotheses.
experiment. The excluded fraction is 1− 2k
pi
√
N
. This implies for instance that, if we just plan
to do 1000 trials, we immediately know we have excluded 94.0% of the hypotheses with
a confidence level corresponding to k = 3. Such concrete advance knowledge is impossible
with any other mapping of hypotheses to probabilities. In order to see this, suppose we
had, instead of eq.(11), a linear mapping of hypotheses to probabilities. Following eq.(5),
the excluded fraction of hypotheses would be given by 1−2k∆p, which, for N = 1000 and
k = 3, can be anywhere between 90.5% and 99.1% (eq.(4) has been used for the limits
of p at 0 and 1, because the approximate form of eqs.(5) and (6) is invalid there). But
without actually doing the experiment and obtaining the data we could not say anything
more specific.
Another graphical presentation of the mapping of χ to p is shown in Fig.5a. The
circle is a segment of the axis of χ which corresponds to one full period. The axis of the
probability p is the diameter of the circle. Projecting the uncertainty limits of p onto the
circle gives the corresponding uncertainty limits of χ. Yet another representation of χ
is obtained by placing this drawing into the complex plane such that the bottom of the
circle is at the origin, and then tilting it by an arbitrary angle, as shown in Fig.5b. This
representation is used by quantum theory. Later we will see that it is more powerful for
forming predictions than the purely real representations.
To summarize this section, we found a unique mapping of hypotheses to probabilities.
From the point of view of probability theory we simply derived that random variable,
whose standard deviation asymptotically becomes an invariant under different outcomes
L of the experiment. That is why our finding has nothing to do with elementary physical
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Figure 5: a) The mapping of eq.(11) depicted as projecting points of p-axis perpendicularly
outwards onto a circle, whose diameter is the p-axis. b) Embedding this into the complex plane,
such that the origin coincides with the point p = 0 defines a mapping of probability p to a point
β, which lies on the circle that represents the χ-axis. One finds p = |β|2. The phase of β is
free, because it depends on the arbitrary choice of the tilt angle ϕ between the p-axis and the
imaginary axis.
experiments, in particular. (A similar observation was made by Brukner and Zeilinger,
when trying to find an invariant information measure for 2-level systems [16].) However,
we will see that there is a deeper reason why χ or β are useful quantities in binomial exper-
iments like elementary quantum yes-no setups, and less useful ones in seemingly analogous
everyday procedures like estimating the fraction of red cars in a city by determining their
fraction in just a few streets.
In the following sections we will derive other quantities from more complex experimen-
tal schemes. We will from now on no longer emphasize that by means of an experiment
we eliminate hypotheses. We will switch to the usual manner of saying that we measure
quantities. And we will reserve the term ”physical quantity”, to measurable quantities
which have the same invariance properties as we required from our quantity χ: The uncer-
tainty interval must get smaller with each additional observation, and it must be invariant
under different outcomes of the experiment.
4 Observation of a probability as a function of a pa-
rameter
We will now measure the probability of a click in detector 1 in the experiment of Fig.2 for
several different physical situations, which we will characterize by the preparation parame-
ter t. (This need not be time.) We would determine t by means of auxiliary measurements,
which would ultimately have to be resolvable into observations of probabilities, but would,
of course, not involve detections at either detector 1 or detector 2. For the present it will
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suffice to assume that we can set t and verify this setting. Let us measure the fraction
of clicks at detector 1 as a function of a sequence of different settings tj , j = 1, ...,M .
For simplicity we assume the values of the tj to be aequidistant, and without restricting
generality we can let t have integer values , thus tj = j. But we assume that arbitrary
values in between can also be set. With each setting tj we do Nj trials. We will first
analyse the experiment by means of the the real label χ and then repeat the analysis by
using the complex label β.
4.1 Real labels for hypotheses
Following eq.(10) we derive the physical quantities χj. In accordance with eq.(9) we obtain
their respective uncertainties as
∆χj = N
−1/2
j (12)
where we set C = 1. Having done this, what other quantities can we form, whose uncer-
tainties have the same invariance properties as the ∆χj such that we can consider them
as physical quantities? Clearly, such other quantities can only be linear functions of the
χj . Let them be denoted by gl, l = 1, ...,M :
gl =
1
M
M∑
j=1
aljχj + ηl, (13)
where alj , and ηl are arbitrary real constants. In order that at each setting tj additional
data will contribute equally to a decrease of uncertainty of the gl, we must require alj = ±1.
The uncertainty intervals are then
∆gl = ∆g =
1
M
√√√√√ M∑
j=1
1
Nj
. (14)
Depending on which of the alj we set +1 and which we set −1 the quantities gl may be
more or less meaningful. But we can obtain a particularly useful linear combination when
we give up the constraint on the alj and let them be coefficients in a Fourier series. For
simplicity we assume that M is odd, thus we write M = 2K+1, and we divide the gl into
the sine coefficients sl and the cosine coefficients cl. Then, for l = 0, ..., K:
cl =
1
M
M∑
j=1
χj cos
(
2πjl
M
)
+ η
(c)
l (15)
and
sl =
1
M
M∑
j=1
χj sin
(
2πjl
M
)
+ η
(s)
l , (16)
where we have s0 = 0, so that there are again just M different quantities. As before, we
also have arbitrary real additive constants, η
(c)
l and η
(s)
l . The uncertainty intervals are
∆cl =
1
M
√√√√√ M∑
j=1
cos2
(
2pijl
M
)
Nj
(17)
and
∆sl =
1
M
√√√√√ M∑
j=1
sin2
(
2pijl
M
)
Nj
. (18)
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However, here we are faced with the problem that the cosine function becomes zero for
certain combinations jl, for which obtaining additional data with the setting tj does not
result in a decrease of ∆cl. The same holds for other combinations jl for the sine function
and the corresponding ∆sl. Therefore, according to our definition of a physical quantity,
not all of the cl and sl would qualify for this status.
In order to remedy the situation we are led to consider assigning to one physical
quantity two numbers, instead of just one. We will do this by expanding into the plane of
complex numbers. We can now define for l = −K, ..., K:
hl = cl + isl =
1
M
M∑
j=1
χj exp
(
i
2πjl
M
)
+ ζl, (19)
where ζl = η
(c)
l + iη
(s)
l are arbitrary complex constants. If the hl are to be accepted as
physical quantities, their uncertainties must only depend on the numbers of trials Nj made
at the various settings tj , and must strictly decrease when any of the Nj increases. Since
our definition of uncertainty is equal to the standard deviation of the respective random
variable when the number of trials becomes large, we can again employ the gaussian
approximation and obtain
∆hl =
√√√√√ M∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂hl∂χj
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(∆χj)
2 =
1
M
√√√√√ M∑
j=1
1
Nj
. (20)
Obviously, the ∆hl have the required properties, so that the hl are physical quantities.
Moreover, all the hl have the same uncertainty.
Nevertheless, there is a conspicuous asymmetry between the physical quantities χj
and the equally physical quantities hl. The former are by design real, while the latter
are in general complex. It is therefore suggestive to start right away with a complex
representation of χ as is shown in Fig.5b. We will do so, but we do not want to motivate
this step by formal elegance. Rather, we will first show that predictions based on the
quantitities hl as derived from real χj are too consistent to be credible.
PREDICTIONS BASED ON χ: From a formal point of view a prediction is
no different to a measurement. It is the calculation of just another random variable
from observed data. But, of course, a prediction contains the assumption that from data
known to the observer something can be said about the range of possible values of random
variables that the observer will obtain from other measurements. According to what rules
should such predictions be made? Normally, models of the world, or at least of a particular
aspect of the world are invented for the purpose. We shall refrain from this. In the spirit
of this paper a prediction must become more accurate with an increase of the number of
trials of the probabilistic experiments from whose outcomes the prediction is calculated.
And, of course, the uncertainty of the prediction must be an invariant of the outcomes
of these experiments. This will ensure the predicted quantity to be a physical quantity.
To form such quantities, we can again rely on a linear combination of observed physical
quantities.
Presently we will use the observed hl to form predictions of the values of χ that will
be observed for settings of our control parameter t, for which we have not yet made an
experiment. Naturally, we have no guarantee that our predictions will hold true when
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testing them. Let the predictions be denoted by χ′(t):
χ′(t) =
K∑
l=−K
(hl − ζl) exp
(
−i2πl
M
t
)
=
1
M
K∑
l=−K
M∑
j=1
χj exp
[
i
2πl
M
(j − t)
]
. (21)
Of course, when t is an integer j from 1 to M we have χ′(t = j) = χj. The uncertainty of
χ′(t) due to an uncertainty of the observed quantity χj is given by
∆jχ
′(t) =
∣∣∣∣∣∂χ
′(t)
∂χj
∣∣∣∣∣∆χj = 1M
∣∣∣∣∣1 +
K∑
l=1
2 cos
[
2πl
M
(j − t)
]∣∣∣∣∣ 1√Nj . (22)
As expected, we have ∆jχ
′(t = j) = ∆χj . If t is not an integer, ∆jχ′(t) depends most
strongly on the uncertainty of the nearest data point, and less strongly on the uncertainties
of remote data points, as shown in Fig.6. This meets our intuition as to which data points
are the most important for making the prediction. A closer inspection of eq.(22) and
of Fig.6 reveals that for t not an integer we have ∆jχ
′(t) 6= 0 for all j, j=1,...,M. This
means that all observed data enter into the prediction χ′(t). Most importantly, however,
∆jχ
′(t) is invariant of the particular data that we observed, and it strictly decreases with
an increase of the number of observations, Nj . The overall uncertainty of the prediction is
∆χ′(t) =
√√√√√ M∑
j=1
|∆jχ′(t)|2, (23)
and it, too, is invariant of the outcomes of the experiments and decreases with an increase
of any of the Nj . This qualifies the prediction χ
′(t) as a physical quantity.
In order to test the prediction we will have to calculate p[χ′(t)] for the desired t using
eq.(11). We must, of course, decide on the constants C and θ already when determining
the values of χj from the observed probabilities. Then we can do an experiment with the
setting t and compare this new observation with the prediction.
Unfortunately, we cannot trust the prediction χ′(t). First, we note an ambiguity in
assigning a value to χ from a measured probability p using eq.(11). It is evident from
Fig.4 that, fixing the constants C and θ is not sufficient to obtain a unique value for χ,
because of the sinusoidally periodic relationship between p and χ. Even if we select a
specific period, there are always two possible values for χ, except when p = 0 or p = 1.
So, in general, a series of M different settings of t permits to derive 2M different sets of
the physical quantities hl, l=-K,...,K, and hence equally many different predictions χ
′(t)
for any given t. Two examples are shown in Fig.7.
The possibility of so many predicted functions is clearly unsatisfactory. Not only do
we predict a range of different experimental outcomes for any new setting of the control
parameter t, but our method convinces us that each of them is consistent with the known
data. We can wonder why the M observed probabilities should be due to only M underly-
ing physical quantities hl? There could be many more hl, |l| > K, that contribute to the
coming about of the data. But our method gives us no hint about their existence, although
it does not exclude that we invent some and see whether this is compatible with the data.
Therefore, what we would like to have is a means which can tell us on the basis of the
available data, that there might be further quantities hl, |l| > K, because the predictions
derived from the data lead to inconsistencies. For this purpose we shall investigate the
complex representation of χ as shown in Fig.5b.
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Figure 6: Uncertainties of the prediction χ′(t) with t = 6.4 as a function of the uncertainties of
the individual data points χj, j=1,...,M, in an example with M=11 and Nj = 100 trials for all j.
The uncertainty of the closest data point (j = 6) has the strongest influence on the uncertainty
of the prediction. Data need not be known to calculate the uncertainty of the prediction.
4.2 Complex labels for hypotheses
From Fig.5b one obtains by simple trigonometry the complex representation of χ as
β =
(√
p(1− p)± ip
)
e−iϕ. (24)
Assigning a numerical value to β from experimental data requires the choice of a phase ϕ
and a decision whether p shall be projected to the left or the right half of the circle.
The uncertainty of β is given by
∆β =
∣∣∣∣∣dβdp
∣∣∣∣∣∆p = 12√N . (25)
It is invariant under different outcomes of the experiment. Therefore, β is a physical
quantity according to our definition. Because β is such an important quantity — we know
it in quantum theory as the probability amplitude for the specific outcome — we shall also
show that the standard deviation does indeed become independent of the experimental
outcome when the number of trials is large.
The random variable β is given by
β(L/N) =
√
L
N
(
1− L
N
)
+ i
L
N
. (26)
Here, L is again the number of outcomes ”1” in N trials of the experiment of Fig.2. The
probability for ”1” in a single trial is given by p. We neglect a general phase in β, because
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Figure 7: The squares show the best estimates of measured probabilities for M=17 different
settings of the parameter t. The full line is a prediction made by inferring values of χ in the
interval [0,pi] from the observed probabilities and then applying eq.(21) to obtain the predicted
χ′. The dashed line is another prediction, where the values of χ were inferred by randomly
projecting the observed p to the left or right side of the circle of Fig.5a, so that χ could have
values in the interval [-pi,pi].
this would only amount to a rotation around the origin in the complex plane. Similarly,
it is sufficient to consider only one projection of p onto the circle (see Fig.5b).
The expectation value of β is given by summing over all possible experimental results
with the weights according to the binomial distribution
β¯ =
N∑
L=0
N !
L!(N − L)!p
L(1− p)N−Lβ(L/N). (27)
The dispersion of β is given by σ2, where σ is the standard deviation. σ2 is defined as the
expectation value of the absolute square of the difference between β and β¯
σ2(β) =
N∑
L=0
N !
L!(N − L)!p
L(1− p)N−L
∣∣∣β(L/N)− β¯∣∣∣2 . (28)
Elementary transformation yields
σ2(β) =
∣∣∣β¯∣∣∣2+ p+ ip(β¯− β¯∗)− (β¯+ β¯∗) N∑
L=0
N !
L!(N − L)!p
L(1− p)N−L
√
L
N
(
1− L
N
)
. (29)
Noting that the imaginary part of β¯ is equal to p, and that
∣∣∣β¯∣∣∣2 = [Re(β¯)]2 + [Im(β¯)2]2 (30)
we can simplify further to
σ2(β) = −
[
Re(β¯)
]2
+ p(1− p). (31)
Since the first term on the right side, i.e. the real part of the expectation value of β, is
difficult to evaluate analytically it was obtained numerically. The results for σ are shown
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Figure 8: The standard deviation σ of the random variable β =
√
(L/N)(1 − L/N)+ iL/N as a
function of the intrinsic probability p to obtain the outcome ”1” in the experiment of Fig.2. As
the number of trials N increases σ becomes independent of p. In the plot σ was multiplied by√
N to eleminate the overall decrease of the standard deviation with increasing N .
in Fig.8. One notes that σ does indeed become independent of p and that it approaches
the uncertainty of β given in eq.(25): σ → ∆β = 1/(2√N).
Let us now look at the observation of a probability as a function of an experimental
parameter t, as we did before. Again we assume M different settings equidistant in t.
Also, we let M be odd to have the formal advantage of summation indices symmetric
around 0 later on. At each setting we do N trials of the experiment and get the outcomes
L1,...,LM . Then we calculate the best estimates for the βj , j = 1, ...,M as
βj =


√
Lj
N
(
1− Lj
N
)
+ i
Lj
N

 e−iϕj . (32)
Here, we projected p onto the right half of the circle, but the choices of ϕj are still free. Now
we form linear combinations of the various βj which correspond to the Fourier expansion:
vl =
1√
M
M∑
j=1
βj exp
(
i
2π
M
jl
)
(33)
for l = −K, ..., K and 2K + 1 = M . We have introduced the scale factor 1/√M with
the purpose to obtain equal uncertainties of the vl and the βj . By virtue of the fact
that the dispersion of a sum of random variables is equal to the sum of the dispersions
of these random variables the uncertainties ∆vl will also be independent of the outcomes
L1, ..., LM . We have:
∆vl =
√√√√√ M∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂vl∂βj
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(∆βj)
2 =
1
2
√
N
, (34)
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where we have made use of eq.(25). The invariance of the uncertainties of the vl under
different experimental outcomes, and the strict decrease of the uncertainties with more
trials, qualifies the vl as physical quantities. Clearly, this is also true if the M experiments
were not all done with the same number of trials and eq.(34) would not reduce to such a
compact form. With this, we can now turn to forming predictions.
PREDICTIONS BASED ON β: Using the quantities vl we form predictions for
arbitrary settings of the parameter t by means of Fourier synthesis
β ′(t) =
1√
M
K∑
l=−K
v∗l exp
(
−i2π
M
lt
)
=
1
M
K∑
l=−K
M∑
j=1
βj exp
[
i
2π
M
l(j − t)
]
. (35)
The uncertainty of β ′(t) for a given experimental setting t is
∆β ′ =
√√√√√ M∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∂β
′
∂βj
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(∆βj)2 =
√√√√√ 1
M
M∑
j=1
(∆βj)2 =
1
2
√
N
. (36)
It is thus also independent of the experimental outcomes and decreases with the number
of trials. Therefore, the prediction β ′(t) is a physical quantity. Note that ∆β ′ is also
independent of t.
Now we want to compare predictions made on the basis of χ to those made on the basis
of β. For this purpose we have used the same data as in Fig.7 and calculated predictions
β ′(t), which are shown in Fig.9. Clearly, we have an infinite number of possibilities to form
the prediction function β ′(t), because to each observed βj we can assign an arbitrary phase
ϕj. But here, Fig.9 points to a severe problem: The transformation back to a probability
according to p = |β ′|2 can result in values p > 1, which are clearly meaningless.
The reason for the occurrence of nonsensical predictions is that the inferred vl do not
fulfill the relation
M∑
j=1
|vl| ≤ 1, (37)
such that the summation (35) is not bounded by 1. But, of course, it is possible that
there are observations in which the data fulfill this relation. This tells us something:
The arbitrary phases ϕj we assigned to each observed βj cannot be chosen as freely as
we thought. In fact, we are forced to consider them determined by the experimental
conditions, at least relative to each other, because the predictions for the probability for
not yet observed settings t depend crucially on them. We will remark on the implications
in the discussion.
The experiment can set limits on the possible combinations of the various ϕj, such that
the above inequality is fulfilled. However, it could well happen, that no combination of
the assigned phases ϕj leads to a prediction function which is bounded by |β ′(t)| ≤ 1.
Therefore we can use the above inequality to separate the kinds of parameters, as a
function of which we are observing a probability, into two groups. Those, which fulfill
this inequality, and those which don’t.
This distinction is not new. A similar distinction is quite natural in quantum physics,
where we can observe a probability as a function of a parameter, and where the sum of
these probabilities may or may not have to be limited by 1. Consider the following three
examples:
i) Observation of the arrival of a particle in a region of space. Our detector ”1” would
cover this region, detector ”2” would represent the rest of space. The parameter t would
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Figure 9: The squares show the best estimates of the same measured probabilities as in Fig.7
for the different settings of the parameter t. The full line is a prediction made by inferring values
of βj with the free phases ϕj all set to zero and then applying eq.(35) to obtain the prediction
function β′(t). The dashed line is an example of the prediction function when random phases ϕj
are assigned to the inferred values of βj .
label adjacent regions in space to which we move detector ”1” successively and repeat the
experiment with the identically prepared particle. Clearly, the sum of the probabilities at
detector ”1” cannot exceed 1.
ii) Quite generally, measurement of the probability to find the particle in one of several
possible states. Our detector ”1” would detect for different states as a function of the
parameter t, such that each new setting of t would test for another possible state. De-
tector ”2” would in each case collect together all the other states. Again, the sum of the
probabilities measured at detector ”1” cannot go beyond 1.
iii) Measurement of the probability to find a spin-1/2 particle in the state |+z >, when it
has been prepared in the state |+ b > . Detector ”1” would record the state |+ z >, and
detector ”2” would record | − z >. Our parameter t would label the angle between ~b and
~z. Since we can adjust the successive settings of the angle arbitrarily close, summation of
the measured probabilities of arrival in detector ”1” has no upper limit.
These examples show that the observation of a probability as a function of a parameter
has something to do with the concept of ”system”. So far we have avoided speaking of
”systems”, because we would have introduced an unjustified ad hoc structure. But now we
have a first indication that it may be meaningful to start categorizing data as pertaining
to ”systems”, although in this paper we cannot penetrate further into this question. It is
necessary to emphasize that working with the purely real quantities χj would never have
pointed us to the problem. There, the prediction function is always well behaved, because
the predicted χ′ can have any value and the derived expectation for the probability will
never leave the interval [0,1]. Using the βj is thus a more discriminatory method. The
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complex representation of observed probabilities by means of β extracts potentially more
information from the data than the real representation χ. Therefore, we will from now on
use only β. As we have already remarked, it is what quantum theory calls the probability
amplitude.
At this point we must mention that the existence of a deeper structural relation between
probability theory and the quantum theoretical calculus has already been emphasized by
Lande [17], and is also shown by Peres [18]. A more mathematical work of Fivel comes to
the same conclusion [19]. And that the superposition principle is not of ”physical” origin
was recently elucidated by Orlov [20].
5 Correlations
So far we have assumed that our probabilistic experiment of Fig.2 is performed under
well defined conditions, which are themselves ultimately verified by a huge number of
elementary detectors. At these exterior detectors we only verify the probabilities of clicks.
If these are the same as in the previous trials, at the chosen level of accuracy, we say
we have the same conditions. In actual experiments one rarely checks such probabilities
themselves. Instead one reads quantities, which are at least in principle derived from them,
from indicators of instruments, e.g. readings of lengths, currents, etc. (We imagined our
parameter t to be verified in this manner.) And in large part the check of the conditions
are evaluations of the human senses, which inform us only about mean values, anyway
(e.g. when the experimenter verifies by tactile and visual inspection that all the cables
are connected in the same way as in the previous trial). Therefore, the data we subsumed
under the heading conditions, are not analysed at the level of clicks.
We will now improve on this situation by looking at one of the conditions in detail.
For simplicity we will pick out one condition, which up to now was only monitored as the
relative frequency with which a click occurred in one of two detectors. Now, occurrence
of the click in one detector shall mean another condition than occurrence of the click in
the other, so that we are doing the observation at our original two detectors under two
different conditions (we exclude other combinations of clicks at the two new detectors
as possible conditions). The setup is shown in Fig.10. It is the familiar arrangement of
experiments on the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradoxon. Observations are made at two
sites, each equipped with two detectors. We observe coincidences of clicks of one detector
at site A with one at site B, under well defined conditions. (Coincidences need not be
restricted to a specific time interval. Only some procedure of relating data of site A with
those at site B is needed, which is independent of the data itself.) We do not regard clicks
in both detectors at just one site, nor more than one click in a detector. Therefore we
have four possible events: (A1,B1), (A1,B2), (A2,B1), (A2,B2). From the point of view
of the observer at site A, he or she is observing the relative frequencies of clicks in the
detectors under the two different conditions that at site B either detector 1, or detector 2
fires. Conversely, the observer at site B registers the relative frequency of clicks in the two
detectors under the two different conditions that at site A either detector 1, or detector
2 fires. The overall view is that we have a probabilistic experiment under well defined
conditions, where one trial can have four possible outcomes.
Let us first assume the point of view of the observer at one site, say A. Observer A may
start out by neglecting the clicks at site B, i.e., he only convinces himself that the relative
frequency of clicks at B1 and B2 remains constant, just as all other conditions, while he is
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Figure 10: Two yes-no experiments. At each site a click can happen in one of two detectors.
The physical conditions determine the probabilities for the four possible outcomes.
doing the N trials. He is then effectively doing the sort of experiment of Fig.2. (In practice
A may not even be aware of the existence of site B. Then he just has to assume that all
unknown conditions are constant. In fact physics relies on this assumption, because an
experimenter cannot monitor the whole world while doing some particular observation.)
In N trials detector A1 fires LA times, detector A2 fires N−LA times. From these data
observer A can extract the probability pA to obtain a click at A1, and the corresponding
physical quantity βA in the manner discussed in section 4.2, and he may measure these
quantities as a function of various parameters. It may well happen that he finds no
parameters by which he can adjust pA in its full range from 0 to 1. In that case observer
A can come to two different conclusions:
i) He may assume that this specific probabilistic experiment simply cannot yield all of
the logically conceivable results. The most general conclusion would be that the present
state of the world excludes some possibilities. (”Constants” of nature would ultimately
manifest themselves in such a way.)
ii) He may assume that looking at the conditions of the experiment only at the level
of averages is insufficient. He must start to search which of the exterior measurements
monitoring the conditions of his experiment he will have to analyse at the level of clicks.
Then he will have to perform the experiment anew, where he now bins the data according
to which of the possible outcomes are occurring at that other measurement. Thus he must
observe correlations of clicks at two sites. If this is still not sufficient to obtain the full
range from 0 to 1 for the various coincidence probabilities by adjusting the experimental
conditions, he must postulate the need to look for yet another one of the measurements of
the conditions and look at it at the level of clicks. He would then have triple-coincidence
probabilities. As a general rule he must integrate so many of the condition-monitoring
measurements and take them into account at the level of clicks, until the observed multi-
coincidence probabilities can be tuned to any value between 0 and 1 by changing proper
parameters (in turn monitored by exterior measurements, but not at the level of clicks).
Thus he is lead to the overall view.
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We will now analyse the experiment of Fig.10 by adopting the overall view and assum-
ing that no further exterior conditions need to be monitored at the level of clicks. Suppose
we perform N trials and we obtain the numbers of concident firings L11, L12, L21, and L22.
The first and the second subscript refer to the detector which fired at site A, and at site
B, respectively. These numbers obey the constraint
L11 + L12 + L21 + L22 = N. (38)
With this we can estimate the unknown probabilities of the four possible outcomes. Their
best estimates and the respective uncertainties are (see eq.(3) and eq.(6))
pjk =
Ljk
N
, (39)
∆pjk =
√
pjk(1− pjk)
N
, (40)
where j and k can each be 1 or 2. And using eq.(24) we also obtain the associated physical
quantities βjk as
βjk =


√
1− Ljk
N
+ i
Ljk
N

 e−iϕjk , (41)
whose uncertainties are invariant under different results, as required (eq.(25)):
∆βjk =
1
2
√
N
. (42)
Clearly, we have
|β11|2 + |β12|2 + |β21|2 + |β22|2 = 1, (43)
so that the experiment yields three independent random variables. From the previous
section we know that the phases ϕjk are arbitrary as long as we are not basing predictions
on them. Since a common phase can be extracted, we have three free phases whose values
cannot be determined in the experiment, but which we must consider as measurable, in
principle. Altogether we must thus postulate six independent possibilities of influencing
the outcomes in an experiment of the type of Fig.10. We note that quantum theory comes
to the same conclusion: It also requires three independent complex probability amplitudes,
hence six real numbers, to describe the situation. The result of the observation can now
be written as a complex vector of the physical quantities βjk. Setting ϕ22 = 0 ist looks
like this: 

β11
β12
β21
β22

 =


(√
1− L11
N
+ iL11
N
)
e−iϕ11(√
1− L12
N
+ iL12
N
)
e−iϕ12(√
1− L21
N
+ iL21
N
)
e−iϕ21√
(L11+L12+L21)
N
+ iN−L11−L12−L21
N


. (44)
The three free random variables are L11, L12, L21 and the three free phases are ϕ11, ϕ12,
ϕ21.
The result vector indicates in no way that it represents coincidence outcomes at pairs of
detectors at two different sites. It could equally well be the result vector of a probabilistic
experiment where one trial can give four different outcomes at just one site. Therefore,
whatever functional dependencies of the outcomes on the experimental conditions we ob-
serve, they are neither restricted nor expanded by the fact that the data are collected
21
as coincidences of two clicks at two detectors which are distant from each other. The
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradoxon rests on the acceptance of ”distance” and ”spatial-
ity” as we know them from everyday life as unquestioned primitive notions [21]. Already
special and general relativity have shown the need to scrutinize these notions, although
they have made no attempt to found them on more elementary ideas. Indeed, an under-
standing of ”distance”, ”orientation”, ”space” (of whatever dimension) from pre-geometric
concepts seems a formidable task. But it is of utter importance if we take the common
or the ultimate observer of Fig.1 seriously as the bare minimum needed to start doing
empirical science.
One can now analyse the experiment of Fig.10 when measuring the coincidence proba-
bilities as a function of various parameters. But we will not really find anything different
from the quantum theoretical description of the possible measurements on two correlated
spin-1/2 systems, although we would understand the emerging structures as consequences
of the method how the observer gains information at the level of clicks. Therefore, we
shall leave this as a possibly entertaining exercise to the reader.
6 Discussion
Several of the points presented in this paper deserve further comments. The first is our
unquestioned acceptance that clicks just occur. What is a click, when looked at more
closely? Philosophically, it is the transition from not-knowing to knowing which of several
possibilities has become actual. For the human individual it is the advance forward in
time by one small step, experiencing what this moment is filled with, and naming this
experience. A name is, of course, the statement of exactly one out of finitely many
possibilities. This connects it to technical measurement, which consists in recording which
of finitely many pointer positions is found. Why in both cases only a finite amount of
information is captured in finite time is not clear. Perhaps, because mind balks when
trying to think the opposite (at least my mind does).
A second point is whether our search for invariants in probabilistic experiments must
be restricted to probabilistic experiments that are in some sense ”fundamental”. What
is the difference of observing the fraction of red cars in a city, to pick up on our initial
doubts, to observing the fraction of counts in a particular detector? Well, the probabilistic
measurement of the fraction of red cars in a city is only superficially a yes-no experiment.
In fact it is a probabilistic experiment with a huge number of possible outcomes, and we
just subsume one group of the outcomes into ”red” and the other group into ”not red”.
While this may have become clear in our analysis of correlations, let us look at it again in
an example.
Data taken from a ”fundamental” scattering experiment where a particle can end up
in one of M detectors look no different to the data obtained by letting balls bounce
through an array of obstacles so that each ball can end up in one of M different baskets.
Both will conform to the multinomial distribution of order M . In both cases we can
observe the probabilities as a function of various parameters. The difference is that in the
ball experiment we are actually not distinguishing only M different outcomes, but many,
many more. A ball hitting a specific obstacle and going to basket 1 constitutes a different
experiment to a ball not hitting this obstacle but still ending up in basket 1. We have
been sloppy and not monitored the conditions properly! So we can start to do all kinds of
measurements on the obstacles while the balls are bouncing through, and select out only
those cases, where we are convinced that they were done under the same conditions of the
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obstacles, possibly the same temporal evolution of the conditions of the obstacles while
a ball is bouncing through. But then we find that one ball in basket 1 may have come
to lie there differently from the next ball in basket 1. Again we have been sloppy! We
must now be even more discriminate and select only those cases, where the ball ends up
in exactly the same position and same orientation in a basket. This is still not enough.
We can still make many more distinctions in a trial than just the M possible outcomes,
e.g. we could screen the balls for the most minute differences in weight, we could record
the patterns of light that are reflected from a ball while bouncing through, etc. But all
these externally testable conditions must be the same in each trial, before we can say that
we are doing a fundamental probabilistic experiment. If we manage to do that with balls,
then we are justified in forming predictions on the basis of our analysis. Our conclusion
is here no different to that of quantum theory [22].
This raises the question, whether fundamental probabilistic experiments are possible
at all. The strict answer is no, because an observation can never be repeated. As we have
already noted, an experimenter cannot monitor the whole world and ensure all conditions
are the same in the successive trials of a probabilistic experiment. Epistemologically, the
minimum difference is the record of the previous trials. An experimenter can just try to
find out which conditions must be controlled and which can be neglected. In fact, this is
how we learn about the world, and it gives us a basis for categorizing it! It is very likely
that further analysis along the principle guideline of this paper that, through observation
our knowledge about the world can only increase, general rules can be found of how to
separate relevant from irrelevant conditions. Presumably this is related to the concept
of ”distance”, whose origin clearly lies in human muscular self-experience, and which
must therefore be cracked. But as we have not addressed how probabilistic observation is
connected to a number of terms which are similarly up for disection, but are indispensible
for doing physics, terms like ”system”, ”space”, ”interaction”, etc., we cannot say anything
more concrete.
Let us now comment on the consequences of the fact that the physical quantitity β,
which we found associated with a measurable probability, is a complex variable. We have
noted that the prediction function β ′(t) is only uniquely determined when we assign specific
values to the phases of the observed physical quantities βj (eq.(35) and Fig.9). More
correctly, we must assign specific phase differences ϕj − ϕk between any two observed βj ,
βk. They influence our predictions, which are testable, so that we must take these phase
differences seriously as measurable quantities. This implies that, with each observable
probability, which is just one number, we must associate two measurable numbers! One of
these numbers is obtained by the observed relative frequency L/N , but the other is buried
in the conditions and only its relative value is testable. Nevertheless, as a general statement
we find that, a measurable probability is governed by two conditions, which can be controlled
separately. Of course, knowing quantum theory, this comes as no surprise. But our analysis
started out by avoiding pre-conceived notions about the world, so that this finding has
another significance. We can dare to speak of how a probability is related to the world.
If we call an observable probability an elementary system, as has recently been advocated
[16], this turns into the visual imagery that an elementary system has a relation to the
conditions of the world, which is given by two parameters. A closer inspection reveals,
and actually Fig.5b is already suggestive of it, that these two parameters are equivalent
to the polar coordinates fixing the direction of a unit vector in 3-dimensional cartesian
space! Thus we can say that an observable probability, or an elementary system, has a
controllable orientation with respect to the world, as if this world were 3-dimensional.
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Of course, ”distance” or ”location” do not yet exist here. A similar connection between
the 3-dimensionality of space and the fact that quantum theory assigns a complex two-
component spinor to any yes-no problem has been emphasized by Weizsa¨cker [8], and also
expounded by Lyre [11]. An interesting proof was sketched by Penrose [23] and worked
out by Moussouris [24]. The latter assigns an angle between any two multilevel quantum
systems from the inner product of the angular momentum operators and then shows that
the simultaneous angles of many such systems are compatible with presenting each system
as a vector in 3-dimensional space. There, too, the concepts of ”distance” and ”location”
are secondary.
Our method of constructing predictions requires a further remark. We have applied it
only to predict probabilities when the experimental control parameter t was set between
values at which measurements have been performed. How shall we form predictions in
cases, where we want to say something about the outcome probabilities to be expected in a
different experimental setup than the one from which we obtained data for the prediction?
What laws should we apply then? As a general rule, it must also be linear laws, just
like those that we have used, because this ensures that more information obtained in the
original experiment will lead to higher accuracy of the prediction for the other experiment.
Take the double slit experiment as an example. We measure the probability of a particle
to hit a certain small region on a screen behind the double slit. First we do a measurement
with the left slit closed, then one with the right slit closed. Now we want to predict the
probability when both slits are open. Here, we have no easy parameter t with which to
label the three experiments, so that the prediction would again be a kind of interpolation.
Nevertheless, the belief that the two one-slit experiments have a lawful relation to the
case when both slits are open leads us to apply a linear combination of the two respective
quantities β. As one can verify, this gives the correct result, except for an unknown phase.
Finally, let us address the testability of our method of inferring physical quantities
and forming predictions. We have already noted that we should expect any measurable
probability to be adjustable between 0 and 1 — no matter how many coincident clicks
constitute an event. The practical difficulty may lie in finding the experimental conditions
which one must tune to achieve this. Also, the method always refers to not yet controlled
conditions if a test of a predicted probability disproves the prediction. It does not do so
in ”physical” terms, it only insists that there must be something in the conditions which
has so far eluded our control while doing the trials. And formally it immediately offers a
way to incorporate this uncontrolled condition: Its says that the trials so far must have
happened under R different conditions, where R is an initially unknown integer. If we
only manage to do the trials under any of these R conditions, but always the same one,
then our observed probability will become tunable between 0 and 1. Effectively, it tells
us to go to the next higher level of coincidence! This can lead to a regress without end.
Thus there is no criterion of how to falsify this method. This is a point of worry, because
our method seems to be identical to the quantum theoretical Hilbert space formalism.
Quantum theory also just adds a few extra dimensions to Hilbert space and says they
must have been floating during the experiment, otherwise we would have observed what it
predicts. Consequently, quantum theory might be the frame from which there is no escape,
and here I mean the Hilbert space formalism and not so much the physico-muscular lyrics
around it. Of course, this conclusion is only warranted as long as we believe in the two
tenets of empirical investigation on which we based our analysis:
i) Any observation has finitely many possible outcomes and one just happens.
ii) Only the probability of an outcome is meaningful.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we characterized the physicist’s situation as being engulfed by a stream
of observed data, where some data signify the conditions and others the outcomes of
experiments. The most notable feature of this situation is that information increases with
each observed bit, because with it the experimenter knows the answer to a particular
yes-no question, while he had at best a guess before the observation. (And contrary to a
widely held misconception, there are no sure guesses. New information always counts.)
We argued that probability is the proper tool for extracting meaning, because it ex-
pects the least information from the data. Then we heeded Born’s advice to simply look
for invariants. This lead us eventually to complex probability amplitudes as random vari-
ables with the highest degree of invariance: Their uncertainty strictly decreases with each
observation and is independent of the experimental result. A sequence of probabilities
observed as a function of a tunable condition results in other quantities to represent prob-
abilistic information, which have the additional symmetry of being independent of that
condition. A complex probability amplitude is then seen as a linear superposition of these
quantities.
Predictions for observable probabilities must similarly be formed by linear addition of
complex probability amplitudes from other observed probabilities, in order to ensure that
the prediction becomes more accurate with more observations as input, but is independent
of the results of these experiments. In case a prediction fails, rather than doubting the law
for making predictions, the search for invariants lead us to postulate that the experiments
on whose data the predictions were based, must have been ill controlled, and that this
can be remedied by going to a higher level of observing coincidence probabilities. As a
consequence we obtain a description of the observer’s world, as if it were the Hilbert space
of quantum theory.
An insight of our analysis is that a probability, and more correctly a probability am-
plitude, is related to experimental conditions in two independent ways, so that one can
see it oriented with regard to the experimental conditions as a unit vector in 3-dimensional
cartesian space. This is, of course, ontological language. But the finding indicates a con-
nection between the assumption of intrinsic probability and the unexplained effectiveness
of believing to exist in a 3-dimensional world.
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